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ABSTRACT
We analyze deflationary bubbles in a model where money is the only financial asset. We show that
such bubbles are consistent with the household's transversality condition if and only if the nominal
money stock is falling. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in several prominent contributions
to  the  literature,  where  deflationary  bubbles  are  ruled  out  by  appealing  to  a  non-standard
transversality condition, originally due to Brock. This condition, which we dub the GABOR
condition, states that the consumer must be indifferent between reducing his money holdings by one
unit and leaving them unchanged and enjoying the discounted present value of the marginal utility
of that unit of money forever. We show that the GABOR condition is not part of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for household optimality nor is it sufficient to rule out deflationary bubbles.
Moreover, it rules out Friedman's optimal quantity of money equilibrium and, when the nominal
money stock is falling, it rules out deflationary bubbles that are consistent with household optimality.
We also consider economies with real and nominal government debt and small open economies
where private agents can lend to and borrow from abroad. In these cases, deflationary bubbles may
be possible, even when the nominal money stock is rising. Their existence is shown to depend on
the rules governing the issuance of government debt.
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This paper revisits the existence of de￿ ationary bubbles and the terminal conditions that
rule them out.1 A striking feature of the current and past macroeconomic literature on
de￿ ationary bubbles is the divergence of opinion over the correct speci￿cation of both
the transversality condition in models where money is the only ￿nancial asset and the
correct speci￿cation of the transversality and long-run solvency, or "no-Ponzi-game",
conditions in models where there are both money and bonds. Given the extent of the
disagreement and confusion in the literature and the recent resurgence of interest in
de￿ ationary bubbles, we believe that it is useful to provide the correct (in the case of
money only) and what we believe are the most attractive (in the case of money and bonds)
terminal conditions. We use these conditions to specify when (rational) de￿ ationary
bubbles can and cannot exist.
The literature we are extending goes back to two seminal papers by Brock [5], [6].
Brock analyzes a closed-economy model where households save and receive liquidity ser-
vices from holding money. At the time his papers were written, the necessary conditions
for household optimality in in￿nite-horizon models ￿even for the special case of bounded
utility functions ￿were not widely known. Brock correctly stated that a necessary con-
dition is that the consumer must be indi⁄erent between permanently reducing his money
holdings by one unit, and enjoying a one-period marginal increase in utility due to the
increased consumption, and leaving his money holdings unchanged and enjoying the dis-
counted present value of the marginal utility of that unit of money forever. Brock￿ s
mathematical formulation of this idea is equivalent to an expression which looks like
a transversality condition, but which is, in general, neither necessary or su¢ cient for
household optimality and this has resulted in confusion.
The mispeci￿cation of a terminal condition in decades-old papers would be of little
consequence except that the important results on de￿ ationary bubbles in Brock [5], [6]
1By terminal conditions we mean restrictions that apply in the limit as time goes to in￿nity. These
include transversality and "no-Ponzi-game" conditions.
1and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [23] depend on the exact speci￿cation of the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for household optimality. As many developed economies have expe-
rienced de￿ ation in recent years, the issue is now of relevance to both academics and
policy makers. The continued mistreatment of transversality conditions in such recent
and important textbooks as Azariadis [1] and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [24] also deserves
mention. In this paper we provide the correct speci￿cation of the transversality condition
that, together with the Euler equation, comprise the necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for household optimality in Brock￿ s model. We provide (for completeness) a proof that
these conditions are su¢ cient for optimality, and using the technique in Kamihigashi￿ s
[17] elegantly simple proof, we also provide a proof that, under certain assumptions, the
transversality condition is necessary.
Consistent with the early papers, we assume that the money supply grows at a con-
stant rate ￿ > 1 (or falls, if ￿ < 1). Using the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
household￿ s optimisation problem, we then provide the correct speci￿cation of when de￿ a-
tionary bubbles can and cannot occur. We demonstrate that de￿ ationary bubbles cannot
occur when money growth is strictly positive (￿ > 1). We show, however, that when the
money supply is contracting, but at a lower rate than the discount factor (￿ < ￿ < 1),
de￿ ationary bubbles can occur; indeed, any separable utility function satisfying the usual
regularity conditions can produce a de￿ ationary bubble. We show that if the money
supply contracts at a rate greater than the discount factor (￿ ￿ ￿), then de￿ ationary
bubbles cannot exist.
Confusion about the correct terminal conditions also exists in models with both money
and bonds. Turnovsky [28] (p. 24) and Ljungqvist and Sargent [18] (p. 511) assert that
the household faces two transversality conditions: one for the terminal stock of bonds and
one for the terminal stock of money. Perhaps more common, however, is the claim that
there is only one transversality condition on the sum of the terminal stocks of debt and
money: this assertion is made by Woodford [32] (p. 70) and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [24] (p.
534). In addition to the household transversality conditions, in a model with money and
2debt, both the household and government each face another terminal condition in the
form of a restriction on their feasible sets (or speci￿cation of their intertemporal budget
constraint), often referred to as a "no-Ponzi-game" condition.2 Here too there is dissent.
Brock and Turnovsky [7] (p. 182) and McCallum [21] (p. 19) claim that households
face a restriction on their terminal stock of non-monetary wealth. Farmer [12] (p. 236)
and Benhabib, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe [2] (p. 541), [3] (p. 73), [4] (p. 3) and Weil
[29] (p. 39) on the other hand, assert that the restriction should be on the sum of the
terminal stocks of monetary and non-monetary wealth. Buiter [8] (Section 2) argues that
the government￿ s terminal condition is a restriction on its terminal stock of bonds, while
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [10] (p. 1224) state that the restriction should be on the
sum of the government￿ s terminal stocks of money and bonds.
We argue that the restriction on the household￿ s and government￿ s feasible sets is most
appropriately a restriction on their terminal stocks of bonds. Given this assumption we
demonstrate that the household has a single transversality condition that, along with
the Euler equations, is necessary and su¢ cient for optimality. This condition says that
the inner product of the vector of state variables (money and bonds) and the vector of
present discounted values of marginal returns from increases in current state variables
remains non-positive as time goes to in￿nity. Together with the no-Ponzi-game condition
restricting the terminal stock of bonds, the single transversality condition is equivalent
to two transversality conditions: one on money and one on bonds.
Using these two transversality conditions, we demonstrate that de￿ ationary bubbles
exist or fail to exist under the same circumstances as in the model with money only and
we show that de￿ ationary bubbles are characterised by nominal interest rates tending to
zero. Given the two transversality conditions, the de￿ ationary bubbles accompanied by
strictly positive money growth in Woodford [32] and Benhabib, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
[2] cannot exist.
Section 2 of the paper contains the model with money only; section 3 analyses the
2It is not uncommon for authors to make no distinction between these two types of restrictions.
3existence of de￿ ationary bubbles in the model of section 2; section 3 extends the model
of section 2 to one with money and bonds. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2 The Model when Money is the Only Financial Instrument
2.1 The households
The economy is inhabited by a representative household and its government. Each pe-
riod, the household receives an exogenous endowment of the single perishable consump-
tion good and pays a lump-sum tax. It consumes the good and saves non-interest-bearing
money. The household receives liquidity services from its money holdings and has pref-






t =Pt); 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where ct ￿ 0 is time-t consumption, Md
t ￿ 0 is the household￿ s time-t demand for nominal
money balances; Pt is the period-t money price of the good and u : R2
+ ! R [ f￿1g.3




t =Pt = y ￿ ￿t ￿ ct + M
d
t￿1=Pt; t 2 Z+; (2)
where y > 0 is the constant per-period endowment and ￿t < y + Md
t￿1=Pt is the period-t
real lump-sum tax. Households take as given their initial money holdings Md
￿1 > 0. We
only consider outcomes where 1=Pt 2 R2
++ for every t 2 Z+. There is, however, always a
non-monetary equilibrium where 1=Pt = 0 for every t 2 Z+. In this outcome, money is
not held and the household consumes its after-tax endowment each period.
































3R ￿ (￿1;1); R+ ￿ [0;1); R++ ￿ (0;1) and Z+ = f0;1;2;:::g:
4We use the notational convention fxtg ￿ fxtg
1
t=0.
4We use the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (i) u(c;m) > ￿1 for (c;m) 2 R2
++; (ii) u is C1 on R2
++, concave
and has uc (c;m) > 0 and um(c;m) ￿ 0 for (c;m) 2 R2
++.
Assumption 2 There exists a constant ￿ 2 R and a summable sequence fbtg such
that ￿
t[uc (c;m)c + um (c;m)m] ￿ ￿￿
tu(c;m) + bt, for every (c;m) 2 R2
++; t 2 Z+:5
Assumption 3 uc (c;m) ! 1 as c & 0, um(c;m) ￿ uc (c;m) ! 1 as m & 0.
Assumption 4 There exists ￿ u 2 R++ such that limm!1 uc(c;m) = ￿ u:
Assumption 5 Either (i) um(c;m) > 0 for (c;m) 2 R2
++ and limm!1 um(c;m) = 0
or (ii) for every c 2 R++ there exists ^ m(c) 2 R++ such that um(c;m) > (=) 0 if
m < (￿) ^ m(c).
Not all of these assumptions are used for all of our results.


















t =Pt) = um(ct;M
d
t =Pt) + (￿Pt=Pt+1)uc(ct+1;M
d
t+1=Pt+1); t 2 Z+ (3)












t =Pt ￿ 0: (4)
The proof of the above proposition for similar problems is standard (see, for example,
Brock [5]). For completeness, a proof for this particular problem is provided in the
Appendix.
Equation (3) is typical of the Euler equations that characterise investment in a con-
sumer durable and has the following interpretation. The household is indi⁄erent between






and foregoing this consumption and acquiring a one-unit increase in period-t real bal-





; and which can be traded next pe-
5A sequence fxtg is said to be summable if
P1
t=0 jxtj < 1: Assumption 2 puts a limit on how fast
utility can go to minus in￿nity when consumption or real balances go to zero. Suppose that u(c;m)
= h(c) + v (m). If h(c) = ln(c) or c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) and v (m) = ln(m) or m1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), ￿ > 1, then
Assumption 2 is satis￿ed. However, if h(c) = e￿1=c or v (m) = e￿1=m, then it is not satis￿ed. See
Ekeland and Scheinkman [11].
5riod for Pt=Pt+1 units of the consumption good, which yields a discounted utility of
(￿Pt=Pt+1)uc(ct+1;Md
t+1=Pt+1):
The transversality condition in an in￿nite-horizon problem is often viewed as the
analogue of the period-T complementary slackness condition in a T-period ￿nite-horizon




T=PT)] = 0 or Md
T=PT = 0. If Assumption 3 (the Inada conditions at zero) holds
then Md
T=PT > 0 and households are willing to hold real balances only up to the point
where the marginal utility gain from the current liquidity services of money equals the
marginal utility loss from decreased current consumption. In our in￿nite-horizon problem
equation (4) implies that either the optimal value of the state variable, Md
t =Pt; goes to
zero as time goes to in￿nity or that its marginal contribution to the optimised value of
the objective function, ￿
t ￿
uc(ct;Md




That the transversality condition is a necessary condition in problems similar to this
one was ￿rst proved by Weitzman [30]. His proof, however, requires the strong assumption
that the utility function is bounded and does not cover common utility functions such
as u(c) = ln(c) or c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), ￿ > 1, where u(c) ! ￿1 when c & 0. Ekeland and
Scheinkman [11] showed that under certain assumptions, the transversality condition is
also necessary for unbounded utility functions. Kamihigashi [17] relaxes some of Ekeland
and Scheinkman￿ s conditions and demonstrates that if utility does not go to minus in￿nity
too quickly as consumption falls to zero and if the sequence of within-period discounted
utilities is summable at an optimum, then the transversality condition must hold at that
optimum.



























satis￿es the transversality condition (4).
As the problem here is not identical to the one considered by Kamihigashi, a proof
￿which follows Kamihigashi￿ s closely ￿is provided in the Appendix. Kamihigashi only
requires that the set of points at which the utility function takes on a value strictly greater
6than minus in￿nity be an open set. Our stronger assumption that the utility function is
strictly greater than negative in￿nity on R2
++ simpli￿es the proof.







following feasible perturbation: at time T, the household reduces its real balances to
￿Md￿
T =PT and increases its consumption to c￿
T + (1 ￿ ￿)Md￿
T =PT, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1: There-






t=T+1 : Then, op-
timality requires that utility with the optimal sequence is at least as great as util-






























=(1 ￿ ￿). If
the right-hand-side of this inequality can be shown to go to zero as T ! 1, then apply-
ing ￿ ! 1 to the left-hand side, using the de￿nition of a derivative and letting T ! 1
establishes the result.
It is typical to consider models where Assumption 3 holds. In this case, the Euler







++; t 2 Z+: A proof of this can be







t =Pt = 0: (5)
In the remainder of Section 2 and in Section 3, we assume that Assumptions 1 - 5 hold
and we refer to equation (5) as the transversality condition.
2.2 The government
The government￿ s within-period budget constraint, assumed to hold with equality, is
Mt=Pt = g ￿ ￿t + Mt￿1=Pt; t 2 Z+; (6)
7where g 2 [0;y) is constant per-period public spending and Mt is the time-t money supply.
We assume a constant proportional growth rate for the money stock:
Mt+1=Mt = ￿ > 0; t 2 Z+: (7)
The sequence of lump-sum taxes is endogenously determined to make public spending
and the growth rate of the money stock consistent with the sequence of within-period




t = Mt; t 2 Z+ and
ct = c ￿ y ￿ g; t 2 Z+: (8)
De￿nition 2. Given fMtg, an equilibrium is a sequence of prices fPtg such that
Pt 2 R++; t 2 Z+; and fc;Mt=Ptg is optimal for the household.
De￿nition 3. If fPtg is an equilibrium sequence of prices then fmtg, where mt ￿
Mt=Pt; t 2 Z+, is an equilibrium sequence of real balances.
Substituting (8) and the money market clearing condition into (3) and (5) yields
￿uc(c;mt+1)mt+1 = ￿[uc(c;mt) ￿ um(c;mt)]mt; t 2 Z+ (9)
lim
t!1￿
tuc(c;mt)mt = 0: (10)
In what follows we will use the following:







Propositions 1 and 2 and De￿nitions 2 - 4 yield the following remark.
Remark 1. A sequence fmtg; mt > 0; t 2 Z+; satisfying (9) and (10) is an equilib-
8rium sequence of real balances. If fmtg is an equilibrium sequence of real balances then
it satis￿es (9) and, if it satis￿es the summability condition, then it satis￿es (10).
There are two potential types of equilibria. First, given our constant fundamentals
(y;g;￿); there is a fundamental (or Markov or "minimal-state-variable") equilibrium
where mt = m > 0 for every t 2 Z+: Constant real balances clearly satisfy (10). By (9)
such an equilibrium has
￿um(c;m) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)uc(c;m) = 0: (11)
If ￿ < ￿ or if ￿ = ￿ and um(c;m) > 0; m 2 R++, then the left-hand side of equation
(11) is strictly positive for every m 2 R++ and no fundamental equilibrium exists. If ￿ = ￿
and there is satiation in real balances then any m ￿ ^ m(c) satis￿es equation (11), where
^ m(c) is as de￿ned in Assumption 5(ii). Such an outcome is a Friedman Optimal Quantity
of Money (OQM) equilibrium, where the nominal stock of money declines proportionally
at the rate of time preference and the household is satiated at a ￿nite stock of real
balances. If ￿ > ￿; then by Assumptions 3 - 5, ￿um(c;m) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)uc(c;m) ! 1 as
m & 0 and ￿um(c;m)￿(￿￿￿)uc(c;m) ! ￿(￿￿￿)￿ u < 0 as m ! 1: Thus at least one
fundamental equilibrium exists. For this case, the additional restriction that real balances
are a normal good at any ￿xed point would ensure that the fundamental equilibrium is
unique.6
In addition to fundamental equilibria, there can be a variety of non-fundamental
(or non-stationary) equilibria. (See Matsuyama [19] and Azariadis [1]). An equilibrium
can be stable, with monotonic or cyclical convergence; it can be unstable, with either
monotonic or cyclical divergence; there can be limit cycles and there can be chaotic
behaviour. We are interested in equilibria where real balances go to in￿nity; such equilibria
are called de￿ ationary bubbles.
6If u is twice di⁄erentiable we can write this condition as: ucumm ￿ umucm < 0 at a ￿xed point.
93 De￿ ationary bubbles
In this section we consider the existence of de￿ ationary bubbles.
3.1 The de￿nition of a de￿ ationary bubble
Economists have many di⁄erent de￿nitions of bubbles, depending on the scenario under
consideration. Here we have equilibria which depend solely on the fundamentals (and,
hence, are not time varying) and equilibria which depend on time as well as on the
fundamentals. Of the equilibria which depend on time as well as on the fundamentals,
we will de￿ne the ones that go to in￿nity over time to be de￿ ationary bubbles. This is a
standard de￿nition; see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [23].
De￿nition 5. A de￿ ationary bubble is an equilibrium where mt ! 1 as t ! 1.
Note that this de￿nition does not imply that an equilibrium sequence of prices which
goes to zero must be a de￿ ationary bubble or that all de￿ ationary bubbles must have the
price level going to zero. When the nominal money stock is falling, then a fundamental
equilibrium has Pt+1=Pt = Mt+1=Mt = ￿ < 1 and the price level goes to zero over time.
When the nominal money stock is rising, a de￿ ationary bubble has Pt+1=Pt = ￿mt=mt+1
and can be associated with rising prices if real balances are rising at a rate less than
￿. Along such a path however, in￿ ation will be less than the associated fundamental
equilibrium￿ s in￿ ation rate of ￿.
3.2 Brock￿ s restriction on optimal programmes
Writing before the publication of Weitzman￿ s [30] proof of the necessity of the transver-
sality condition for bounded utility functions, Brock [6] (p. 140) proposed a necessary
condition for optimal programmes. He made a "no-arbitrage" argument that at an opti-
mum, the household must be indi⁄erent between permanently reducing his real balances
by one unit today and enjoying a marginal increase in today￿ s utility due to higher con-
sumption and leaving his real balances unchanged and enjoying the discounted utility











As shown in the previous section, there are two necessary conditions for household
optimality: the ￿rst is the Euler equation, which relates time-t variables to time-t + 1
variables. The necessity of this condition is shown by switching small amounts of con-
sumption and real balances between time-t and time-t + 1 and then demonstrating that
the ￿rst path yields at least as high utility as the second. The second type is the transver-
sality condition which is a condition on the asymptotic behaviour of consumption and real
balances as time goes to in￿nity.8 Brock￿ s proposed perturbation is a change in current
consumption and real balances and, hence, does not establish a transversality condition.
Indeed, Brock [6] shows that the transversality condition (4) is a su¢ cient condition and
this suggests that he did not view equation (12) as a transversality condition.



























t+T=Pt+T)(1=Pt+T) = 0: (14)
At an equilibrium this can be written as
lim
t!1(￿=￿)
t uc(c;mt)mt = 0: (15)
Thus, Brock￿ s mathematical formulation of his "no-arbitrage" argument, when combined
7Brock assumed a separable utility function; this condition is the non-separable analogue to his
condition.
8See Ekeland and Scheinkman [11] for a discussion of this.
11with the Euler equation produces an equation that looks like a transversality condition
and this has apparently led to a substantial amount of confusion. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
[22] (p. 681), [23] (p. 360-1) and Gray [15] (p. 110) and ￿more recently ￿Azariadis
[1] (p. 403,405) and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [24] (p. 541-542) all reproduce Brock￿ s "no-
arbitrage" argument and use it to claim that equation (14) is a transversality condition
and necessary for household optimality.9 In the rest of the paper we refer to condition
(14) as the GABOR (Gray-Azariadis-Brock-Obstfeld-Rogo⁄) condition.
The proof of Proposition 2, demonstrating that transversality condition (4) is neces-
sary for household optimality, employs Brock￿ s proposed perturbation of current (that
is time-t) and future real balances and consumption. However, as seen in equation (33)
in the Appendix (and also in the discussion under the statement of Proposition 2 in the
text), the mathematical expression for this perturbation di⁄ers from Brocks, and is used
only asymptotically ￿as time goes to in￿nity.
The GABOR condition has been used to study the theoretical existence of de￿ ationary
bubbles by Brock [5], [6] and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [23] in their well-known papers. In
his Theorem 3 (p. 140), Brock [6] assumes a separable utility function: u(c;m) =
h(c)+v (m): He attempts to show that for ￿ > ￿ no de￿ ationary bubble can satisfy the
GABOR condition. As this is not in general true, he imposes an additional condition:
there exists a ￿ < 0 such that for su¢ ciently large m, v0 (m) < m￿. This condition is
weak, if not particularly intuitive. Thus, if equilibria must satisfy the GABOR condition,
then it is only in "pathological" cases that de￿ ationary bubbles can exist. Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄ [23] consider the case of ￿ > 1 and show that under the stricter, but more
intuitively appealing, condition that utility is bounded above in real balances, imposing
the GABOR condition is su¢ cient to rule out de￿ ationary bubbles.10
9Gray [15] notes that transversality conditions generally require the product of the state variable and
its discounted value to go to zero as time goes to in￿nity, as in equation (4). In her paper and in Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄ [24] the money stock is constant and hence equation (4) and equation (14) turn out to be
the same. However, the technique they use to derive (14) would yield (4) if the money supply were not
constant.
10Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [23] restrict attention to this case because they claim that Brock￿ s proposed
perturbation of an optimal sequence is not feasible otherwise. Equations (2) and (33) (in the Appendix)
12By (10) and (15) the transversality condition implies the GABOR condition when
￿ > 1 and the GABOR condition implies the transversality condition when ￿ < 1; the
conditions are equivalent when ￿ = 1. Thus, if ￿ > 1 and a sequence fmtg satis￿es the
summability condition and has mt ! 1 as t ! 1, then using the GABOR condition
to rule out this candidate de￿ ationary bubble is legitimate: the transversality condition
is necessary for household optimisation (Proposition 2) and the GABOR condition is
necessary for the transversality condition. But, it makes more sense to use the stronger
transversality condition. In the next subsection we present a simple proof ruling out
de￿ ationary bubbles that requires no additional assumptions.
If ￿ > 1; mt ! 1 and fmtg does not satisfy the summability condition, then neither
the transversality condition nor the GABOR condition have been demonstrated to be
necessary. Hence, they cannot be used to rule out de￿ ationary bubbles.11
When ￿ < 1 it is not legitimate to use the GABOR condition to rule out de￿ ationary
bubbles satisfying (9) and (10). As the transversality condition is su¢ cient (Proposition
1), the stronger (in this case) GABOR condition cannot be necessary. In the next sub-
section we show that any sequence fmtg satisfying (9) and where mt ! 1 also satis￿es
the transversality condition and is an equilibrium de￿ ationary bubble.
3.3 The relationship between the transversality condition and the "no-bubble"
boundary condition
Turning brie￿ y to a di⁄erent scenario, consider the market for a particular company￿ s
stock in a model without money in the utility function. Under certainty the household￿ s
Euler equation corresponding to that stock says that ptu0 (ct) = ￿ (pt+1 + dt+1)u0 (ct+1),
0 < ￿ < 1;where u is the within-period utility function and ct, pt and dt are the time-t
consumption demand, stock price (in terms of the consumption good) and (exogenous)
make it clear that the perturbation ￿as speci￿ed in (33) ￿is always feasible.
11Suppose that u(c;m) = h(c)+v (m), where v (m) = m1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) if 1 6= ￿ > 0 and v (m) = ln(m)
if ￿ = 1. If fmtg satis￿es (9) and mt ! 1 as t ! 1 then fmtg satis￿es the summability condition if
￿
￿￿1￿￿ < 1. Details on request.
13dividend, respectively. Suppose that, as in our model, ct = c ￿ y ￿ g, t 2 Z+: Then,
solving the Euler equation forward would yield pt =
P1
s=1 ￿
sdt+1 + limT!1 ￿
Tpt+T: Thus,
the stock price consists of a term Ft ￿
P1
s=1 ￿
sdt+1, which depends on the fundamentals
(that is, the dividends), and a term Ct ￿ limT!1 ￿
Tpt+T.
This latter term may be strictly positive if investors have self-ful￿lling expectations
that the price will rise by more than is justi￿ed by the fundamentals. Alternatively, this
term may be written as Ct = k=￿
t, where k ￿ 0. Solutions where k > 0 and, hence
Ct 6= 0 are often referred to as rational or equilibrium bubbles. They might be viewed as
unlikely or not "sensible" as they are not Markov or "minimal-state-variable" solutions
in McCallum￿ s [20] sense as they depend on an extraneous variable: calendar time. In
theoretical models it is typical to impose the boundary condtion limT!1 ￿
Tpt+T = 0 to
rule out such equilibria. In empirical models, deviations between pt and the fundamental
component, Ft; are often referred to as a bubble and researchers often test for the existence
of a bubble by testing whether the price can be explained by the fundamentals: in this
example, this would be testing whether pt = Ft:
The boundary condition ruling out bubble equilibria looks like a transversality con-
dition and some researchers, for example Froot and Obstfeld [14], call this condition a
transversality condition. However, it is not related to the transversality condition which,
under certain assumptions, is necessary and su¢ cient for household optimality. In the
model of stock prices this transversality condtion would be limT!1 ￿
Tu0 (cT)pTsT ￿ 0,
where st is the household￿ s time-t holdings of the stock. In the model of this paper, when
the Euler equation (3) is solved forward to ￿nd Brock￿ s condition (13), it looks simi-
lar to the procedure where the equilibrium condition ptu0 (ct) = ￿ (pt+1 + dt+1)u0 (ct+1);
ct = c;t 2 Z+ is solved forward to ￿nd the stock price as the sum of a fundamental
solution (Ft) and a bubble component (Ct) and the bubble component is then set equal
to zero.
In our model, the analogous procedure for decomposing the general form for an equi-
librium into fundamental and bubble components is not to solve the household￿ s Euler
14equation forward, but to solve the equilibrium condition (9) forward. Equation (9) is not,
in general, linear and this prevents a closed-form solution, but in this model with constant
fundamentals, the analogue to Ft is the constant fundamental equilibrium ￿ m that solves
(11). For the particular case of u(c;m) = h(c) + lnm, equation (9) is linear and can be
solved forward to ￿nd mt = ￿ m + limT!1 (￿=￿)
T mt+T. Thus, for this special case the
GABOR condition can be used to rule out paths of real balances which are consistent
with household optimisation and market clearing, but which depend on a variable other
than the fundamentals.
3.4 The existence of de￿ ationary bubbles
In this subsection we use the equilibrium conditions to characterise when de￿ ationary
bubbles can and cannot exist.
Proposition 3. Suppose that a sequence fmtg has mt ! 1 as t ! 1: (i) If ￿ > 1
and fmtg satis￿es the summability condition, then fmtg is not an equilibrium sequence
of real balances. (ii) If ￿ < ￿ < 1 and fmtg satis￿es (9) then fmtg is an equilibrium
sequence of real balances.
Proof. Suppose that ￿ > 1 and let xt ￿ uc(c;mt)mt > 0. By (9), xt+1=xt = (￿=￿)[1
￿um(c;mt)=uc(c;mt)]; t 2 Z+. By Assumptions 3 and 4, xt+1=xt ! ￿=￿ as mt ! 1.
Thus, 8￿ > 0;9T 2 Z+ such that xT+t+1=xT+t > ￿=￿ ￿ ￿; t 2 Z+. Let ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿:
Then ￿
T+txT+t > ￿
TxT > 0; t 2 Z++: Hence, ￿
T+txT+t cannot go to zero as t ! 1 and
(10) is violated. This yields (i). If fmtg satis￿es (9) then xt+1=xt ￿ ￿=￿;t 2 Z+. Thus,
￿
txT+t ￿ ￿txT ! 0 as t ! 1; T 2 Z+. Thus (10) is satis￿ed.
When ￿ < ￿ < 1 it is easy to ￿nd examples of de￿ ationary bubble equilibria; indeed,
any separable utility function u(c;m) = h(c) + v (m), where Assumptions 1 - 5 are
satis￿ed, produces de￿ ationary bubbles.12 .
When ￿ = 1, the transversality condition and the GABOR condition are identical and
Brock￿ s and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄￿ s results apply here. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [23] provide
an example (suggested by Guillermo Calvo and Roque Fernandez) of a utility function
where the GABOR condition (and hence the transversality condition) alone is insu¢ cient
12When u is separable (9) implies that dmt+1=dmt > mt+1=mt. Thus, dmt+1=dmt is strictly greater
than one at any steady state.
15to rule out de￿ ationary bubbles. This utility function is separable and has the property
that the marginal utility of money is 1=ln(m) for m large. If m￿1 > ￿ m, the sequence,
fmtg that satis￿es equation (9) also satis￿es the GABOR condition and has mt ! 1.
We now consider the case of ￿ ￿ ￿. We show that when money growth equals the
discount factor and there is satiation in real balances, de￿ ationary bubbles cannot exist.
When ￿ < ￿ fundamental equilibria do not exist. This case is not considered by Brock
[5], [6]. We show that there are no de￿ ationary bubbles in this case either. Both results
are a consequence of the Euler equation, rather than the transversality condition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that a sequence fmtg has mt ! 1 as t ! 1: If ￿ ￿ ￿
then fmtg cannot be an equilibrium sequence of real balances.
Proof. By (9), mt+1 = (￿=￿)[uc(c;mt)=uc(c;mt+1) ￿ um(c;mt)=uc(c;mt+1)]mt, t 2
Z+: Thus, by Assumption 1, mt+1 ￿ (￿=￿)[uc(c;mt)=uc(c;mt+1)]mt, t 2 Z+ and, hence,
mt ￿ (￿=￿)t [uc(c;m0)=uc(c;mt)]m0. Thus, limt!1 mt ￿ limt!1 (￿=￿)
t [uc(c;m0)=uc(c;mt)]m0
￿ [uc(c;m0)=￿ u]m0 < 1:
When ￿ = ￿; Brock [6] shows that if u(c;mt) = h(c) + v (m), where v0 (m) > (<;=)
0 for m < (>;=) 0 and limm!1 v(m) = ￿a < 0, a > 0, then de￿ ationary bubbles satisfy
(9) and (10) if and only if a is su¢ ciently small.
In the ￿nal proposition in this subsection we demonstrate that using the GABOR
condition rules out the OQM equilibrium.
Proposition 5. The GABOR condition rules out Friedman￿ s Optimal Quantity of
Money equilibrium.
Proof. Let ￿ = ￿ and let mt = m0 ￿ ^ m. Then (￿=￿)tuc(c;mt)mt = uc(c;m0)m0 > 0
and the GABOR condition is not satis￿ed.
4 De￿ ationary Bubbles with Money and Government Bonds
In this section we extend the model to allow for government debt as well as money.
164.1 Households
We assume that the government issues nominal bonds, in addition to money.13 Since the
nominal interest rate on money is assumed to be zero, an equilibrium with valued bonds
requires that the nominal interest rate be non-negative and to be strictly positive when
the household is not satiated in real balances. We only consider outcomes where this is
true.14
Denote the period-t household demand for bonds by Bd








The household￿ s within-period budget constraint is
a
d
t = (1 + it)(Pt￿1=Pt)a
d
t￿1 + y ￿ ￿t ￿ ct ￿ (itPt￿1=Pt)M
d
t￿1=Pt￿1; t 2 Z+; (16)
where it is the nominal interest rate between periods t￿1 and t and ￿t < (1+it)(Pt￿1=Pt)ad
t￿1
+ y ￿ (itPt￿1=Pt)Md
t￿1=Pt￿1; t 2 Z+. We assume that the household￿ s initial holdings of
money and bonds, M￿1 > 0 and B￿1; respectively, are given.
The household cannot run a Ponzi scheme where it borrows ever-increasing amounts
to service its previously accumulated debt. We impose the restriction that the present






s=0(1 + is) ￿ 0: (17)












s=0(1 + is) ￿ 0: (18)
This no-Ponzi-game condition is an assumption about how the world works and there-
fore a matter of opinion. To see why we prefer (17), imagine an analogous T-period model,
where T < 1. Typically, one would impose a restriction similar in spirit to (17): in the
13Including real bonds is trivial and adds to the notation without changing the results.
14In the money-and-bonds model too, we do not consider the non-monetary equilibrium with P
￿1
t =
0; t ￿ 0:
17last period all previously paid accumulated debt must be repaid and no additional bor-
rowing can take place. Suppose instead that one imposed a restriction similar to (18):
outstanding debt need not be repaid if the household holds real balances equal to the
outstanding debt. It is di¢ cult to see why anyone would lend to the household when
there is no future in which they would be repaid. In addition, if utility is strictly increas-
ing in (end-of-period) real balances, households would want to hold an in￿nite amount
of real balances and an in￿nite amount of debt in the last period and the household￿ s
optimisation problem would have no solution.
Similarly, in an in￿nite-horizon model it is di¢ cult to see why any counterparty would
want the present discounted value of its terminal debt to be strictly positive. If it is argued
that there is some unusual circumstance where a counterparty ￿say, the government ￿
is willing to lend ever increasing amounts to the private sector then using restriction
(18) might be appropriate, but its use presents a problem. The conventional method
of proving the su¢ ciency of the Euler and transversality conditions requires the use of
the stronger condition (17).15 Thus, we are uncertain what the su¢ cient conditions for
household optimality are under the alternative restriction (18).






is said to be feasible if (16) and (17) are
satis￿ed. The de￿nition of optimality is as in De￿nition 1.















++; t 2 Z+, to be optimal are that it
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t =Ptg ￿ 0: (21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
15This is seen in the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix.
18The transverality condition (21) appears unusual, but has the same interpretation as
the transversality condition for the multi-sector growth model in Stokey and Lucas [26]:
the inner product of the vector of state variables and the vector of present discounted
values of marginal returns from increases in current state variables is non-positive as
time goes to in￿nity. Here the value of the marginal return of an increase in current
bond holdings is the marginal utility loss due to foregone consumption; the value of a
marginal increase in current money holdings is the marginal utility loss due to foregone
consumption less the marginal utility gain due to increased liquidity services.













++; t 2 Z+, is optimal then it satis￿es the
transversality condition (21).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the remainder of this section we assume that Assumptions 1 - 5 hold. In this case
the Euler condidtion is necessary as well. By (17) and (20), the no-Ponzi-Game condition











t =Pt ￿ 0: (22)
























t =Pt ￿ 0 and (21) and (22) together




























t =Pt = 0:
(23)







t =Pt=(1 + it+1) = 0. If the
interest rate does not go to in￿nity (which by (19) and Assumption 3 would require an











t =Pt = 0: (24)
194.2 The government
Let bt ￿ Bt=Pt, where Bt￿1 is the government￿ s outstanding stock of bonds at the begin-
ning of period t, and let at ￿ mt +bt: We restrict the government to rules satisfying at +
y ￿ g > 0; t 2 Z+ amd assume that a￿1 + y ￿ g > 0. The government￿ s period-t budget
constraint is
at = (1 + it)(Pt￿1=Pt)at￿1 + g ￿ ￿t ￿ (itPt￿1=Pt)mt￿1; t 2 Z+: (25)




s=0(1 + is) ￿ 0: (26)
However, we assume that the money in the model is unbacked ￿at money. Thus, as
it is irredeemable, it is not a liability of the government (see Buiter [8], [9]) and the




s=0(1 + is) ￿ 0: (27)
We view the government as choosing fMt;Btg such that, given prices and g, fBtg
satis￿es (27).16 The sequence of taxes is then endogenously chosen to satisfy (25).
4.3 Market clearing
Market clearing requires that md
t = mt and ad
t = at; t 2 Z+: As before, the resource
constraint implies that ct = c ￿ y ￿ g; t 2 Z+. The assumption that at + y ￿ g > 0
ensures that it is always possible to ￿nd a sequence of taxes satisfying the assumed
16There exists a substantial empirical literature testing whether or not governments satisfy (27). Using
US data, Hamilton and Flavin [16] and Trehan and Walsh [27] ￿nd supportive evidence; Wilcox [31],
who uses US data, and Smith and Zin [25], who use Canadian data, ￿nd evidence that governments
follow unsustainable policies, suggesting either that the government is playing a Ponzi game or that a
change in policies is expected Of course if governments do not satisfy (27), then they do not satisfy the
the stronger condition (26).
20restriction ￿t < (1 + it)(Pt￿1=Pt)ad
t￿1 + y - (itPt￿1=Pt)Md
t￿1=Pt￿1 = at + y ￿ g+ ￿t;
t 2 Z+. Thus by equations (19), (20) and (23) we have the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 6 An equilibrium sequence of real balances is a sequence fmtg such
that mt 2 R++, t 2 Z+, and





tuc(c;mt)mt = 0: (29)




> (=) 0 if um(c;mt) > (=) 0; t 2 Z+ (30)
As before, a fundamental equilibrium exists when ￿ > ￿. By (28) and (30) it has the
associated nominal interest rate ￿ { = (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿:
4.4 De￿ ationary bubbles in a model with bonds
We demonstrate that adding government bonds to the model does not change the results
of the previous section.
Proposition 8 Suppose that fbtg satis￿es (29) and that fmtg has mt ! 1 as
t ! 1: (i) If ￿ > 1 and fmtg satis￿es the summability condition, then fmtg is not an
equilibrium sequence of real balances. (ii) If ￿ < ￿ < 1 and fmtg satis￿es (28) then
fmtg is an equilibrium sequence of real balances and it+1 ! 0. (iii) If ￿ ￿ ￿ then fmtg
is not an equilibrium sequence of real balances.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3 demonstrates that if fmtg satis￿es (28) and has
mt ! 1 as t ! 1, then fmtg satis￿es (29) when ￿ < ￿ < 1 and fails to satisfy (29)
when ￿ > 1: This yields (i) and (ii). The proof of Proposition 4 demonstrates that if
￿ ￿ ￿ then fmtg cannot satisfy (28). This yields (iii).
Our results are in contrast to the results in Woodford [32] (p. 131-135) and Ben-
habib, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe [2] (section VI.A), who ￿nd that adding debt changes
the regions of the parameter space where de￿ ationary bubbles can exist. They use the
alternative no-Ponzi-game condition (18): They then demonstrate that, when money is
growing at a strictly positive rate, it is possible to have a sequence of real balances that
tends to in￿nity and that sati￿es the Euler equations and this alternative no-Ponzi-game
21condition. This bubble has the property that, as the discounted present value of money
balances goes to in￿nity, the present discounted value of government debt goes to minus
in￿nity.
5 Conclusion
Terminal conditions have been problematic for monetary economists. Their speci￿ca-
tion di⁄ers from paper to paper and textbook to textbook, although the same model
is employed. Restrictions on feasible sets (that is, the "no-Ponzi-game" conditions) are
commonly not distinguished from the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for optimality,
given the particular choice of a restriction on the feasible set. The intent of this paper
is to provide a coherent treatment of the subject for two common models: a model with
money in the utility function where money is the only ￿nancial asset and a model with
money in the utility function and both money and bonds serving as ￿nancial assets.
We specify the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for household optimality, and we
provide the relevant proofs. In the model with money only, we demonstrate that the
transversality condition which is part of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions, di⁄ers
from a condition employed elsewhere in the literature. In the model with money and
bonds we argue for particular restrictions on the household￿ s and government￿ s feasi-
ble sets. Using the restriction on the household￿ s feasible set, we ￿nd the household
transversality condition that, together with the Euler equation, constitutes the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for household optimality. Our result implies that in equilibrium
there are a pair of terminal conditions that must be satis￿ed ￿one on money and one
on bonds ￿rather than the single condition on the sum of the stock of money and bonds
that frequently appears.
The resurgence of actual and prospective disin￿ ation in industrialised countries has
resulted in new interest in the possibility of self-ful￿lling de￿ ationary expectations. We
use our results to demonstrate that, whether there is only money or whether there are
22money and bonds, de￿ ationary bubbles cannot occur with reasonable utilty functions and
positive nominal money growth. However, if the nominal money stock is falling, but not
faster than the discount factor, then any sensible separable utility function can produce
a de￿ ationary bubble. If households have satiation in money balances, then a decline in
money growth that supports Friedman￿ s optimal quantity of money equilibrium (that is,
a decline equal to the discount factor) cannot produce de￿ ationary bubbles.
6 Appendix
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Thus, by (3) and the given initial conditions































































23Equation (4) implies that the right-hand-side is non-positive, establishing the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof requires two lemmas.
Lemma 1. If there exists a constant ￿
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￿;1);8t 2 Z+; (32)
then the transversality condition (4) holds.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) and a summable sequence fetg such
that (32) holds. Let T 2 Z+ and ￿ 2 [￿
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Letting T ! 1 yields the result.












8(c;m) 2 R++;8t 2 Z+: (37)
Proof. Let (c;m) 2 R++ and t 2 Z+: De￿ne v (z) = ￿
tu(zc;zm) for z 2 (0;1]: By the
de￿nition of v, ￿ and bt,
zv
0 (z) = ￿
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tum (zc;zm)zm ￿ ￿￿
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By the de￿nition of v, this yields the result.
To prove Proposition 2, let ￿
￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ 2 [￿
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The sequence fetg is summable; hence, by Lemma 1, the proposition is proved.





be any feasible sequence. By (16)



































































































































































Thus by (19), (20) and the initial conditions











































































































T=PT ￿ 0: By (17)











































The right-hand-side is non-negative by (21), establishing the result.
Proof of Proposition 7. Except for Lemma 1 this follows the proof of proposition 2
in a straightforward manner. In the statement of Lemma 1, (4) is replaced by (21). The
26proof of Lemma 1 is now as follows.
Suppose that there exists a ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) and a summable sequence fetg such that (32)
holds. Let T 2 Z+ and ￿ 2 [￿
￿;1) and de￿ne
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Letting T ! 1 yields that the left-hand-side is non-positive; feasibility ensures it equals
zero.
27References
[1] Azariadis, C. (1993), Intertemporal Macroeconomics, Blackwell Publishers, Cam-
bridge Mass. USA.
[2] Benhabib, J., S. Shmitt-GrohØ and M. Uribe (2002), "Avoiding Liquidity Traps,"
Journal of Political Economy 110, 535-563.
[3] Benhabib, J., S. Schmitt-GrohØ and M. Uribe (2002), "Chaotic Interest Rates,"
American Economic Review 92, 72-78.
[4] Benhabib, J., S. Schmitt-GrohØ and M. Uribe (2001), "Monetary Policy and Multiple
Equilibria," American Economic Review 91, 167-186.
[5] Brock, W. A. (1974), "Money and Growth: The Case of Long Run Perfect Foresight",
International Economic Review, 15, 750-777.
[6] Brock, W. A. (1975), "A Simple Perfect Foresight Monetary Model", Journal of
Monetary Economics, 1, pp. 133-150.
[7] Brock, W. A. and S. J. Turnovsky (1981), "The Analysis of Macroeconomic Policies
in a Perfect Foresight Equilibrium," International Economic Review 22, 179-209.
[8] Buiter, W. H. (2003), "Helicopter Money: Irredeemable Fiat Money and the Liquid-
ity Trap", NBER Working Paper No. 10163.
[9] Buiter, W. H. (2005), " A Small Corner of Intertemporal Public Finance. New Devel-
opments in Monetary Economics: two ghosts, two eccentricities, a fallacy, a mirage
and a mythos", Economic Journal, Conference Papers volume and date?
[10] Canzoneri, M. B., R. E. Cumby and B. T. Diba (2001), "Is the Price Level Deter-
mined by the Needs of Fiscal Solvency," American Economic Review, 1221-1238,
[11] Ekeland, I. and J. A. Scheinkman (1986), "Transversality Conditions for some In-
￿nite Horizon Discrete Time Optimization Problems," Mathematics of Operations
Research 11, 216-229.
[12] Farmer (1999), R. E. A., Macroeconomics of Self-Ful￿lling Prophecies, 2nd edition,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[13] Friedman, M. (1969), ￿ The Optimum Quantity of Money￿ , in Milton Friedman,
The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays, Adline Publishing Company,
Chicago, 1-50.
[14] Froot, Kenneth and Maurice Obstfeld, "Intrinsic Bubbles: the Case of Stock Prices,"
American Economic Review 81, 1189-1214.
[15] Gray, J. (1984), "Dynamic Instability in Rational Expectations Models: An Attempt
to Clarify", International Economic Review 25, 93-122.
28[16] Hamilton, J. D. (1986), "On the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A Frame-
work for Empirical Testing," American Economic Review 76, 808-819.
[17] Kamihigashi, T. (2000), "A Simple Proof of Ekeland and Scheinkman￿ s Result on
the Necessity of a Transversality Condition," Economic Theory 15, 463-468.
[18] Ljungqvist, L. and T. J. Sargent (2000), Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, 1st ed,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[19] Matsuyama, K. (1991), "Endogenous Price Fluctuations in an Optimizing Model of
a Monetary Economy," Econometrica 59, 1617-32.
[20] McCallum, B. (1983), "On Non-uniqueness in Rational Expectations Models: An
Attempt at Perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics 11, 139-68.
[21] McCallum, B. (2001), "Indeterminacy, Bubbles, and the Fiscal Theory of Price Level
Determination," Journal of Monetary Economics 47, 19-30.
[22] Obstfeld, M. and Rogo⁄, K. (1983), "Speculative Hyperin￿ ations in Maximizing
Models: Can We Rule Them Out?", Journal of Political Economy 91, 675-87.
[23] Obstfeld, M. and Rogo⁄, K. (1986), "Ruling out Divergent Speculative Bubbles",
Journal of Monetary Economics 17, 346-62.
[24] Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogo⁄ (1996), Foundations of International Macroeconomics,
The MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
[25] Smith, G. W. and S. E. Zin (1991), "Persistent De￿cits and the Market Value of
Government Debt," Journal of Applied Economics 6, 316-44.
[26] Stokey, N. L. and R. E. Lucas (1989), Recursive Mthods in Economic Dynamics,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[27] Trehan, B. and C. E. Walsh (1988), "Common Trends, the Government￿ s Budget
Constraint and Revenue Smoothing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
12, 425-444.
[28] Turnovsky, S. J. (1997), International Macroeconomic Dynamics, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
[29] Weil, P. (1991), "Is Money Net Wealth?" International Economic Review 32, 37-53.
[30] Weitzman, M. L. (1973), ￿ Duality Theory for In￿nite Horizon Convex Models.￿
Management Science 19, 783-789.
[31] Wilcox, D. W. (1989), "Sustainability of Government Budget De￿cits: Implications
of the Prsent Value Borrowing Constraint," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
21, 291-306.
[32] Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices; Foundations of a Theory of Monetary
Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
29